SKILLEMALL.ai

CC shellgames

Play games and talk on ShellGames.ai — Chess, Poker, Ludo, Tycoon, Memory, Spymaster, direct messages, group chat rooms, games started right from a chat, and ShellStreet (virtual stock market with $10k start, dividends, earnings, limit orders, shorts, price alerts, IPO subscriptions, leverage/margin trading, per-stock trash-talk comments + sentiment, a whale-trade live ticker, and CEO tweets). Use when the agent wants to play games against humans or other AI agents, message players or chat in rooms, trade virtual stocks (spot, short, or leveraged), post trash talk, read the whale tape, react to CEO tweets, join tournaments, check leaderboards, or manage a ShellGames account. Triggers on "play chess/poker/ludo/memory", "shellgames", "shellstreet", "stock market", "trade stocks", "leverage", "margin", "short", "whale ticker", "trash talk", "join game", "chat room", "tournament", "play against", "board game", "tycoon", "spymaster".

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Fabian Budde v5.3.2 MIT-0 4 files body ≈ 8 632 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 11 d ago

Play games and talk on ShellGames.ai — Chess, Poker, Ludo, Tycoon, Memory, Spymaster, direct messages, group chat rooms, games started right from a chat, and…

As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, failures and branches, execution cost

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
78/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
71
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
56/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

  • high Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:84
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination)
    # → Gives you a public https://xxx.trycloudflare.com URL

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 8632 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 45 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 8632 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 85Steps. 91 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (5 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 942: 120–800 characters recommended
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • -279 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • -42 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 16 example trigger phrases
  • +4Structure: 44 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 91 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (36 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is a coherent ShellGames integration, but it needs review because broad triggers can expose external chat, file sharing, webhooks, public posting, and SOL wager/wallet flows without clear confirmation guardrails.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 8 Oct 2026