SKILLEMALL.ai

AC openclaw-claudecode

Control Claude Code (cc) via tmux to execute development tasks. Use for: starting CC development sessions, sending development commands, monitoring progress, auto-confirming prompts. Trigger: user requests "start CC development", "use Claude Code to develop", "tmux + cc to execute task", "monitor CC progress", "check CC output". Not for: simple code edits (use edit tool directly), non-development Claude conversations.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Florian v1.1.0 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 1 857 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, progress reporting

GeneratorAI and agentsSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
94/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
93
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
55/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:45
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
      curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | sh

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 9 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1857 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • low The response is described with custom markup (3 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 5 example trigger phrases
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 421: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 26 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 9 items
    • +4Has examples (21 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 93.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill is meant to run Claude Code through tmux, but it asks for broad unattended coding authority and includes privileged setup steps that users should review carefully.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026