SKILLEMALL.ai

AB salubrista-hah

Use this skill when the user needs analysis, design, implementation, evaluation, dashboards, decision scenarios, or normative guidance for integrated hospitalization systems with emphasis on hospital-at-home and hospital-to-home continuity, especially bed capacity, discharge, re-admissions, transition risk, Director Tecnico HD, or Chilean HD regulation.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: felix-antonio-sl v1.0.1 MIT-0 25 files body ≈ 1 394 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 76/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, progress reporting

AnalyzerInfrastructureData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
90/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
83
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
76/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Result and completion w 14
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump references/agent/IDENTITY.md
      Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (3) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
      references/agent/IDENTITY.md, references/agent/SOUL.md, references/agent/USER.md

    Files scanned: 25. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 76/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 65Failures and branches. 3 branches
    • 85Steps. 74 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1394 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +4No input/output examples
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 355: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 6 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 74 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The healthcare analysis skill is mostly coherent, but it embeds an authenticated inter-agent webhook token and instructions that could forward sensitive case context outside the skill.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026