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BC m365-unified

Unified Microsoft 365 skill for OpenClaw with modular features for Exchange Online (Email), SharePoint, OneDrive, and Planner. Supports webhooks for real-time notifications.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Felix M. v2.0.0 MIT-0 41 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 4 614 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
77/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
79
Quality 40%
74
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
62/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/setup-webhook-integration.sh:90
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    (crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v "auto-renew-webhooks"; echo "$CRON_CMD") | crontab -
Medium and low: 3
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/setup-webhook-integration.sh:87
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    if crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -q "auto-renew-webhooks"; then
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/setup-webhook-integration.sh:90
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    (crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v "auto-renew-webhooks"; echo "$CRON_CMD") | crontab -
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/webhook-handler.js:586
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    const url = `https://api.telegram.org/bot${TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage`;
    placeholder

Files scanned: 41. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 30 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4614 tokens
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 105 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • -223 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • -315 of 25 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 173: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 53 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 105 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (24 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 74.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is mostly a Microsoft 365 integration, but its webhook handler also performs under-disclosed invoice automation and sends email-derived details to Telegram while changing mailbox and SharePoint state.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026