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CC native-install

Install the Mobazha native binary on Linux, macOS, or Windows. Use when the user wants to run a store without Docker.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: fengzie v0.2.0 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 1 188 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, consistency

ProcedureDockerInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
71/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
65
Quality 40%
79
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
55/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 7

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 7
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:19
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -sSL https://get.mobazha.org/install | bash
      vendor-host
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:91
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -sSL https://get.mobazha.org/install | bash -s -- --uninstall
      vendor-host
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:97
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)
      curl -sSL https://get.mobazha.org/install | bash -s -- --uninstall --purge
      vendor-host
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:104
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      - Installs via `curl | bash`, which bypasses Gatekeeper (no Apple Developer signing required)
      quoted
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc SKILL.md:133
      Writes to a shell startup file
      echo 'export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"' >> ~/.bashrc && source ~/.bashrc
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:142
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      This shouldn't happen with `curl | bash` install. If running a downloaded binary directly, use:
      quoted
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-quarantine-file SKILL.md:145
      Removes the macOS quarantine flag from one file (usual for a downloaded CLI; make sure the file is the intended binary)
      xattr -d com.apple.quarantine ./mobazha

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (native-install) differs from the folder (mobazha-native-install)
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Steps. 22 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1188 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Description length 117: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Structure: 22 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 22 items
    • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This is a transparent Mobazha native installer guide, with the main risk being a user-directed remote installer that can create a background service.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026