BC tor-browsing
Configure Tor Browser to access Mobazha stores privately, or run a store as a .onion hidden service. Use for privacy and anonymity setup.
As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, consistency
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 4
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 4
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellSKILL.md:55Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)curl -sSL https://get.mobazha.org/standalone | sudo bash -s -- --overlay tor
vendor-host -
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellSKILL.md:103Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host)curl -sSL https://get.mobazha.org/standalone | sudo bash -s -- --overlay lokinet
vendor-host -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:55Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition)curl -sSL https://get.mobazha.org/standalone | sudo bash -s -- --overlay tor
detector -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:103Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition)curl -sSL https://get.mobazha.org/standalone | sudo bash -s -- --overlay lokinet
detector
Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (tor-browsing) differs from the folder (mobazha-tor-browsing)
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 18 steps
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 894 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 137: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 14 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 18 items
- +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.