BC stripe-setup
Add Stripe payments to any agent-built app. Covers checkout sessions, subscription billing, webhook handling, customer portal, and test-mode validation. Use when you need to accept payments, set up subscriptions, handle billing events, or wire Stripe into a Flask/FastAPI/Express app. No prior Stripe experience needed — follow the steps and you'll have a working payment flow. Assumes Python + Flask on a VPS with a .env file. Adapt patterns for FastAPI, serverless, or other stacks.
As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:205Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionscurl -s https://packages.stripe.dev/api/security/keypair/stripe-cli-gpg/public | gpg --dearmor | sudo tee /usr/share/keyrings/stripe.gpg
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:206Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionsecho "deb [signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/stripe.gpg] https://packages.stripe.dev/stripe-cli-debian-local stable main" | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/stripe.list
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 35 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2517 tokens
- low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 484: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 17 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 35 items
- +4Has examples (10 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.