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FC dianping-api

Dianping (大众点评) API skill for searching restaurants and businesses, viewing shop details, deals/coupons, and reading recommended dishes. Use this skill when: (1) the user asks about restaurants, food, or local businesses in Chinese cities, (2) the user wants to search dianping.com, (3) the user needs shop ratings, reviews, prices, deals, or addresses from 大众点评, (4) any query involving Chinese dining recommendations or local business lookup.

Blockedguard blocked the skill: signs of malicious behaviour
ClawHub Agent Skills author: FJSAND v1.0.0 MIT-0 5 files · 1 script body ≈ 990 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, consistency

IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
35/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
0
Quality 40%
87
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
54/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
Guard blocked this skill: critical findings below. Do not install it until the author fixes them.

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Remove the critical guard findings (secrets, dangerous commands, hidden instructions): while they stand the skill is blocked and cannot grade above F.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 10

  • critical Dangerous commands cmd-encoded-exec install.sh:11
    Executes a base64/encoded payload
    echo "LS0t…1cG
  • critical Dangerous commands cmd-encoded-exec install.sh:14
    Executes a base64/encoded payload
    echo "IyEv…0eV
  • critical Dangerous commands cmd-encoded-exec install.sh:17
    Executes a base64/encoded payload
    echo "IyEv…gRF
Medium and low: 7
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell install.sh:3
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (code comment)
    # Usage: curl -fsSL <URL>/install.sh | bash
    comment
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell install.sh:4
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (code comment)
    #        curl -fsSL <URL>/install.sh | bash -s -- /custom/path
    comment
  • low Obfuscation obf-base64-blob install.sh:11
    Long base64-looking blob (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    echo "LS0t…1cG
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token install.sh:11
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    echo "LS0t…1cG
    quoted
  • low Obfuscation obf-base64-blob install.sh:14
    Long base64-looking blob (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    echo "IyEv…0eV
    quoted
  • low Obfuscation obf-base64-blob install.sh:17
    Long base64-looking blob (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    echo "IyEv…gRF
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token install.sh:17
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    echo "IyEv…gRF
    quoted

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (dianping-api) differs from the folder (dianping-search)
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 13 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 990 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 444: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 12 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 13 items
  • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
  • +3All 2 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a coherent Dianping lookup skill, but it stores and can display live Dianping session cookies, so users should review it carefully before installing.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026