SKILLEMALL.ai

BB podfetcher-tools

Search podcasts, browse episodes, and fetch podcast transcripts from Podfetcher using the bundled Node.js CLI, SDK, or MCP server.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Florian Heiwig v0.5.1 MIT-0 7 files body ≈ 915 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 67/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice, progress reporting

IntegrationMedia and videoAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
72
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
67/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key src/sdk.js:36
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment

Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 67/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 34 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 3 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 915 tokens
  • low The response is described with custom markup (5 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 130: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 12 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 34 items
  • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This is a straightforward Podfetcher API client; it needs a Podfetcher API key and sends podcast queries and transcript requests to the configured Podfetcher endpoint, but I found no hidden local access, persistence, or deceptive behavior.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026