SKILLEMALL.ai

BB twitter-cli

Use twitter-cli for ALL Twitter/X operations — reading tweets, posting, replying, quoting, liking, retweeting, following, searching, user lookups. Invoke whenever user requests any Twitter interaction.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: flyingtimes v0.1.0 MIT-0 40 files body ≈ 2 632 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, consistency

IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
80/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
76
Quality 40%
87
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
68/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Consistency w 8
40
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

The same skill appears in 1 more place: ClawHub

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store README.md:155
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    2. **Browser cookies** (recommended): auto-extract from Arc/Chrome/Edge/Firefox/Brave
Medium and low: 2
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store README.md:494
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - 报错 `No Twitter cookies found`:请先登录 `x.com`,并确认浏览器为 Arc/Chrome/Edge/Firefox/Brave 之一,或手动设置环境变量。
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token twitter_cli/constants.py:9
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "%3D1Z…TnA"
    quoted

Files scanned: 25. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (twitter-cli) differs from the folder (twitter-command)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 100Steps. 11 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2632 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 201: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 29 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 11 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (22 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This Twitter/X skill is functional and mostly disclosed, but it asks for or auto-reads highly sensitive session cookies and can perform account-changing actions with limited safeguards.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026