DD number-two-migration
(no description)
As a process D 48/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The text contains phrases like "ignore previous instructions" or "you are now…". That is an attempt to hijack the agent: it may break your rules, the system limits or company policy.
An honest skill does not need them: state the role and the rules directly without overriding other instructions. Otherwise catalog scanners and corporate filters will block the listing.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 11
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 11
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medium Broad scope
meta-agent-memory-dumpconfig/identity/IDENTITY.mdAgent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (12) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokensconfig/identity/IDENTITY.md, config/identity/SOUL.md, config/identity/USER.md, config/memory/2026-03-04.md, config/memory/2026-03-05.md
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medium Instruction override
en-ignore-previousconfig/system/HEARTBEAT.md:7Instruction-override phrase ("ignore previous instructions") (detector / deny-list definition)- "ignore previous instructions"
detector -
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-shell-rcinstall.sh:158Writes to a shell startup fileecho "请将以下行添加到你的shell配置文件中（~/.bashrc, ~/.zshrc等）:"
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenconfig/memory/2026-03-04.md:47High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)- API密钥：molt…HWW
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenconfig/memory/2026-03-08.md:31High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)- **API密钥：** molt…HWW
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenconfig/memory/MEMORY.md:91High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)- **Moltbook账户信息** - siliconone账户和API密钥（molt…HWW）
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokeninstall.sh:129High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)echo "1. Moltbook API: molt…HWW"
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokeninstall.sh:144High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)export MOLTBOOK_API_KEY="molt…HWW"
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenSKILL.md:99High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)1. **Moltbook API**：`molt…HWW`
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-token二号完整状态迁移指南.md:211High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)- **API密钥：** molt…HWW
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-token二号完整状态迁移指南.md:229High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)- **Moltbook API：** molt…HWW
Files scanned: 26. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- error
frontmatterSKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found - error
name-missingSKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name` - error
description-missingSKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger
Process rating: all ten parameters 48/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 68 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 798 tokens
- low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -216 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 25 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 68 items
- +4Has examples (4 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.