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A text editor for LLMs, not humans.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Frane Bandov v1.4.0 MIT-0 4 files body ≈ 8 904 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 64/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, execution cost

ReferenceAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
75/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
89
Quality 40%
53
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
64/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
30
Execution cost w 6
40
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 3
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-disable-security CHANGELOG.md:223
    Disables a security control (Defender, Gatekeeper, SIP, firewall, execution policy) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - **Migrated to `homebrew_casks:` from deprecated `brews:`**. goreleaser deprecated formula generation in v2.10 in favor of casks. The cask path also gives us `postflight` hooks: a one-line `xattr -dr
    quoted
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host README.md:53
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/frane/agented/master/install.sh | sh
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process CHANGELOG.md:326
    Starts a background / autostarted process (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - **Cross-platform build.** v0.3.0 release-build failed on `wind…d64` because `internal/cli/lsp.go` used `syscall.Kill` and `syscall.SysProcAttr.Setsid`, both Unix-only. Split daemon-spawn into `
    quoted

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-short description under 40 chars: too little signal for triggering
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 8904 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "binary"

Process rating: all ten parameters 64/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 8904 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 100Steps. 60 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 11 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 19 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (59 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 35: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 34 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 60 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (16 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 53.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
Agented is a disclosed agent-focused text editor with sensitive but user-invoked integration features for other agent clients.
LLM: benign (medium) · VirusTotal: · 15 Jul 2026