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BC pixmind-video-to-prompt

Extract a SaaS-style storyboard with local reference frames, timestamps, scripts, scene descriptions, and recreation prompts from one local video or remote URL. Use for video breakdowns, shot lists, storyboard tables, scene prompts, visual recreation, and reverse-engineering video structure.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Pixmind v1.0.1 MIT-0 6 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 1 228 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

Extract a SaaS-style storyboard with local reference frames, timestamps, scripts, scene descriptions, and recreation prompts from one local video or remote URL.

As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ReferenceMedia and videoAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
88
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
58/100
Has gaps
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Inputs and preconditions w 11
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 4

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 4
    • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/video-to-prompt.js:13
      Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
      API key + configurable base URL from environment
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass SKILL.md:40
      Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed
      powershell -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "{baseDir}/scripts/run.ps1" --file "C:\path\to\video.mp4" --language zh-cn --max-scenes 100 --yes --poll
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass scripts/video-to-prompt.js:25
      Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      Windows: powershell -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File run.ps1 [options]
      quoted
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass SKILL.md:34
      Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed (security demo / example)
      powershell -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "{baseDir}/scripts/run.ps1" --url "https://example.com/video.mp4" --language zh-cn --max-scenes 100 --yes --poll
      demo

    Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100

    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 85Steps. 23 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1228 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • -31 of 3 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 292: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 6 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 23 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill does the advertised video storyboard work, but it automatically downloads and runs cached native tooling, which deserves user review before installation.
    LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 1 Sept 2026