DD wecom-voice-agent
(no description)
1. 本技能支持企业微信智能机器人场景，包括被动语音消息处理和主动语音通话 2. 语音转文字由企业微信官方提供，本技能不自行采集或上传用户语音至任何第三方
As a process D 41/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 4
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high Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlreferences/step_by_step_setup.md:122Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination)https://abc1…app/
Medium and low: 3
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medium Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlreferences/step_by_step_setup.md:113Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)获得一个公网地址如 `https://abc1…app`，将其作为回调 URL。
quoted -
medium Exfiltration
net-redirectable-api-keyscripts/voice_clone.py:46Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another serverAPI key + configurable base URL from environment
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenscripts/voice_clone.py:454High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (placeholder value)f.write(b"RIFF…est")
placeholder
Files scanned: 53. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- error
description-missingSKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger - warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 7840 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
Process rating: all ten parameters 41/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 7840 tokens
- 100Steps. 159 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -241 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 90 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 159 items
- +4Has examples (57 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)
- +3All 32 scripts are documented
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 31.