SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

DF claw-compactor

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: gandli-2025 v1.0.0 MIT-0 80 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 3 204 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process F 53/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: scripts/mem_compress.py

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
52/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
87
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
53/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: scripts/mem_compress.py
Tools and files w 18
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
  2. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key proxy/server.mjs:102
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/lib/engram.py:147
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process benchmark/data/sample_05_sysadmin.json:22
    Starts a background / autostarted process (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed; test fixture / example file)
    {"role": "assistant", "content": "Excellent! Enable WireGuard auto-start: `systemctl enable wg-quick@wg0`. Also set up monitoring — alert if the tunnel goes down. A simple cron: `* * * * * ping -c 1 1
    detectorcode literalfixture
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token proxy/package-lock.json:32
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…GLw+xYSd…cqA==",
    detector
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process proxy/start.sh:18
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    nohup /opt/homebrew/bin/node "$DIR/server.mjs" >> /tmp/claude-proxy.log 2>&1 &

Files scanned: 80. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: scripts/mem_compress.py

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: scripts/mem_compress.py
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: scripts/mem_compress.py
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 26 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3204 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (14 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • -48 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • -38 of 11 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 40 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 26 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill has a real token-compression purpose, but it also ships high-impact proxy and automation features that can expose prompts, rewrite workspace files, and run autonomous CLI agents with weak default controls.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026