DB ctf-forensics
Provides digital forensics and signal analysis techniques for CTF challenges. Use when analyzing disk images, memory dumps, event logs, network captures, cryptocurrency transactions, steganography, PDF analysis, Windows registry, Volatility, PCAP, Docker images, coredumps, side-channel power traces, DTMF audio spectrograms, packet timing analysis, CD audio disc images, or recovering deleted files and credentials.
As a process B 67/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, execution cost
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
How to improve
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 28
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 28
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medium Exfiltration
intent-browser-credential-storelinux-forensics.md:90Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (documentation of a security skill)**Chrome/Edge Login Data decryption (requires master_key.txt):**
security skill -
medium Exfiltration
intent-browser-credential-storelinux-forensics.md:330Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (documentation of a security skill)# Cookies (encrypted on modern Chrome — need DPAPI/keychain key)
security skill -
medium Exfiltration
intent-browser-credential-storelinux-forensics.md:357Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (documentation of a security skill)# Saved passwords (requires key4.db + logins.json)
security skill -
medium Exfiltration
intent-browser-credential-storelinux-forensics.md:372Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (documentation of a security skill)**Key insight:** Browser artifacts are SQLite databases with non-standard timestamp formats. Chrome uses WebKit epoch (microseconds since 1601-01-01), Firefox uses Unix epoch in microseconds. Always c
security skill -
medium Broad scope
meta-broad-allowed-toolsSKILL.md:1Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bashallowed-tools: Bash Read Write Edit Glob Grep Task WebFetch WebSearch
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medium Exfiltration
intent-browser-credential-storeSKILL.md:266Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (documentation of a security skill)- **Chrome/Edge:** Decrypt `Login Data` SQLite with AES-GCM using DPAPI master key
security skill -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitydisk-advanced.md:11Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- [Linux Ransomware Memory-Key Recovery (MetaCTF 2026)](#linu…026)
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitydisk-advanced.md:152Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)## Linux Ransomware Memory-Key Recovery (MetaCTF 2026)
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitydisk-advanced.md:154Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)**Pattern:** Linux memory dump + encrypted `.veg` files + `enc_key.bin`; ransomware uses hybrid crypto (AES for files, RSA-wrapped key). Volatility may fail process enumeration due symbol/KASLR (Kerne
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitydisk-advanced.md:164Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)2. **Reverse ransomware binary quickly to identify mode/layout.**
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitydisk-advanced.md:166Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)strings -a ransomware.elf | grep -E "enc_key|EVP_aes|PUBLIC KEY|.veg"
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitydisk-and-memory.md:10Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- [PowerShell Ransomware Analysis](#powershell-ransomware-analysis)
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitydisk-and-memory.md:95Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)**Ransomware key recovery via MFT:**
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitydisk-and-memory.md:145Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)# Look for: credential access, lateral movement, data staging
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitydisk-and-memory.md:192Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)## PowerShell Ransomware Analysis
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitydisk-and-memory.md:387Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- [disk-advanced.md](disk-advanced.md) - Advanced disk and memory techniques (deleted partition recovery, ZFS forensics, GPT GUID encoding, VMDK sparse parsing, memory dump string carving, ransomware
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitydisk-recovery.md:559Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- [disk-and-memory.md](disk-and-memory.md) - Core disk/memory forensics (Volatility, disk image analysis, VM/OVA/VMDK, VMware snapshots, coredumps, KAPE triage, PowerShell ransomware, Android/Docker/c
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitydisk-recovery.md:560Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- [disk-advanced.md](disk-advanced.md) - Advanced disk and memory techniques (deleted partitions, ZFS forensics, GPT GUID encoding, VMDK sparse parsing, memory dump string carving, ransomware key reco
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitylinux-forensics.md:242Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)**Pattern (Moby Dock):** KeePass database (`.kdbx`) found on compromised system contains SSH keys or credentials for lateral movement.
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitynetwork.md:214Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)**Reverse shell indicators:**
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitysignals-and-hardware.md:13Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- [Linux input_event Keylogger Dump Parsing (Pwn2Win 2016)](#linu…016)
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitysignals-and-hardware.md:435Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)## Linux input_event Keylogger Dump Parsing (Pwn2Win 2016)
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitysignals-and-hardware.md:450Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)**Detection:** Binary file size divisible by 24. Challenge mentions keylogger, keyboard, or input device.
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:45Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- [disk-and-memory.md](disk-and-memory.md) - Core disk/memory forensics (Volatility, disk mounting/carving, VM/OVA/VMDK, VMware snapshots, coredumps, Windows KAPE triage, PowerShell ransomware, Androi
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:46Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- [disk-advanced.md](disk-advanced.md) - Advanced disk and memory techniques (deleted partitions, ZFS forensics, GPT GUID encoding, VMDK sparse parsing, memory dump string carving, ransomware key reco
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:53Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- [signals-and-hardware.md](signals-and-hardware.md) - Hardware signal decoding with decode code (VGA frame parsing, HDMI TMDS symbol decode, DisplayPort 8b/10b + LFSR descrambler), Voyager Golden Rec
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:200Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)See [disk-and-memory.md](disk-and-memory.md) for full Volatility plugin reference, VM forensics, and VMware snapshots. See [disk-advanced.md](disk-advanced.md) for deleted partition recovery, ZFS fore
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securitySKILL.md:276Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- **PowerShell ransomware:** Extract scripts from minidump, find AES key, decrypt SMTP attachment. See [disk-and-memory.md](disk-and-memory.md).
Files scanned: 15. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 8439 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
Process rating: all ten parameters 67/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 22 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 8439 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Steps. 141 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 6 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- low 22 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 416: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 23 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 141 items
- +4Has examples (14 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.