SKILLEMALL.ai

BC ganidhuz-foxx

🦊 Ganidhuz-FoxX (Firefox + X combined lol). Browse X/Twitter using a real logged-in Firefox session via cookie injection. Supports profile viewing, tweet fetching, searching, and scrolling feeds — no API key, no bot blocks.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Ganidhu Kandepola v1.0.0 MIT-0 5 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 811 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

IntegrationPlaywrightSoftware developmentAI and agentsWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
84/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
76
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
54/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/export-x-cookies.sh:27
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    DB="$PROFILE_PATH/cookies.sqlite"
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store SKILL.md:12
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (documentation of a security skill)
    Browse X/Twitter through Firefox with your real session cookies. Built because Chromium kept getting bot-blocked by X.
    security skill

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 18 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 811 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 224: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 18 items
  • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
  • +3All 3 scripts are documented
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 76.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is meant to browse X/Twitter with a logged-in Firefox session, but it handles real session cookies and gives broad browser automation power that users should review carefully.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026