SKILLEMALL.ai
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DC crypto-executor

Complete autonomous trading engine for Binance with WebSocket real-time, OCO orders, Kelly Criterion position sizing, trailing stops, circuit breakers, daily performance reports, AND NOW adaptive strategy mixing, memory persistence, and intelligent performance alerts. Self-learning trading bot that improves over time.

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Wesley Armando v2.3.4 6 files body ≈ 3 559 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureTelegramInfrastructureData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
59/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
53
Quality 40%
68
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 15

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 15
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url CONFIGURATION.md:103
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    url = f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{token}/sendMessage"
    quoted
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege CONFIGURATION.md:178
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo chmod 600 /etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege CONFIGURATION.md:179
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo chown root:root /etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url executor.py:421
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    self.api_url = f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{bot_token}/sendMessage" if bot_token else None
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SKILL.md:37
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - "https://api.telegram.org/bot*"
    quoted
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SYSTEMD_SETUP.md:352
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo chmod 600 /etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SYSTEMD_SETUP.md:353
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo chown root:root /etc/crypto-executor/credentials.env
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SYSTEMD_SETUP.md:523
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo cp /etc/systemd/system/crypto-executor.service \
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url CONFIGURATION.md:82
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    https://api.telegram.org/botYOUR_TOKEN/getUpdates
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url skill-card.md:36
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    - [Telegram Bot API endpoint pattern](https://api.telegram.org/bot*) <br>
    placeholder
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process SYSTEMD_SETUP.md:117
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    sudo systemctl enable crypto-executor
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process SYSTEMD_SETUP.md:233
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    sudo systemctl enable crypto-executor
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process SYSTEMD_SETUP.md:497
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    sudo systemctl enable crypto-executor
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process SYSTEMD_SETUP.md:530
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    sudo systemctl enable crypto-executor-conservative
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention SYSTEMD_SETUP.md:540
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    sudo crontab -e

Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "repository"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source"

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 41 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3559 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -244 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 319: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 43 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 41 items
  • +4Has examples (24 code blocks)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 68.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a disclosed Binance trading bot, but it can place real-money orders autonomously, persist across reboots, and run unpinned external helper code, so it needs careful review before installation.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026