BD codex-agent-enhanced
作为项目经理操作 OpenAI Codex CLI 完全体。包含:知识库维护(自动跟踪 Codex 最新功能)、任务执行(提示词设计→执行→监控→质量检查→迭代→汇报)、配置管理(feature flags/模型/skills/MCP)。通过 tmux 操作交互式 TUI,通过 notify hooks + pane monitor 实现异步唤醒。NOT for: 简单单行编辑(用 edit)、读文件(用 read)、快速问答(直接回答)。
As a process D 47/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches
IntegrationSoftware developmentAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 12
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 12
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low Exfiltration
read-dotenvdocs/CONFIG_TEMPLATE.md:220Reads a .env filesource .env # 加载项目 A 的配置
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low Exfiltration
read-dotenvdocs/CONFIG_TEMPLATE.md:225Reads a .env filesource .env # 加载项目 B 的配置
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low Exfiltration
read-dotenvdocs/CONFIG_TEMPLATE.md:245Reads a .env file (detector / deny-list definition)- `source .env` 在 `codex exec` 前执行
detector -
low Exfiltration
read-dotenvdocs/ENHANCEMENTS.md:36Reads a .env filecp .env.example .env
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low Exfiltration
read-dotenvdocs/ENHANCEMENTS.md:42Reads a .env filesource .env
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low Exfiltration
read-dotenvdocs/ENHANCEMENTS.md:98Reads a .env filesource .env
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low Exfiltration
read-dotenvdocs/ENHANCEMENTS.md:114Reads a .env filesource .env
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low Exfiltration
read-dotenvdocs/ENHANCEMENTS.md:157Reads a .env filecat .env # 检查配置是否正确
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low Exfiltration
read-dotenvREADME.md:268Reads a .env file (detector / deny-list definition)3. 执行 `source .env`
detector -
low Exfiltration
read-dotenvSKILL.md:98Reads a .env filesource .env
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low Exfiltration
read-dotenvSKILL.md:127Reads a .env filecd /path/to/project-a && source .env && codex exec ...
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low Exfiltration
read-dotenvSKILL.md:130Reads a .env filecd /path/to/project-b && source .env && codex exec ...
Files scanned: 25. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 47/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, git) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 68 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2447 tokens
- low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
- low The response is described with custom markup (6 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
- -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 222: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 39 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 68 items
- +4Has examples (22 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 69.
External checks
ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is a disclosed Codex automation tool, but it can persistently run hooks and send Codex outputs to Telegram, with risky default routing values.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026