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Portable identity vault for OpenClaw. Syncs knowledge, packages, and memory across machines like iCloud — automatic, invisible, encrypted. Bring your own storage (Google Drive, Dropbox, FTP, Git) or use ClawSync Cloud.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade F
ClawHub Agent Skills author: getlighty v2.0.0 32 files · 14 scripts body ≈ 1 520 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureGoogle DriveSoftware developmentAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
33/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
0
Quality 40%
83
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
58/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Secrets in code medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 21

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell providers/dropbox.sh:12
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    Darwin) brew install rclone 2>/dev/null || curl https://rclone.org/install.sh | bash ;;
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell providers/dropbox.sh:13
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    Linux)  curl https://rclone.org/install.sh | sudo bash ;;
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell providers/gdrive.sh:30
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    Darwin) brew install rclone 2>/dev/null || curl https://rclone.org/install.sh | bash ;;
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell providers/gdrive.sh:31
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    Linux)  curl https://rclone.org/install.sh | sudo bash ;;
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell providers/s3.sh:11
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    case "$(uname -s)" in Darwin) brew install rclone 2>/dev/null || curl https://rclone.org/install.sh | bash ;; Linux) curl https://rclone.org/install.sh | sudo bash ;; esac
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell providers/webdav.sh:11
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell)
    case "$(uname -s)" in Darwin) brew install rclone 2>/dev/null || curl https://rclone.org/install.sh | bash ;; Linux) curl https://rclone.org/install.sh | sudo bash ;; esac
Medium and low: 15
  • medium Secrets in code secret-private-key src/keypair.sh:61
    Private key material (key header without key body; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    pem = b'-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- …
    header onlyquoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token cloud-api-worker/package-lock.json:32
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…jSf+VYVP…nKg==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token cloud-api-worker/package-lock.json:48
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha512-k+xM+swQB…eHe+h6X9…VaQ==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token cloud-api-worker/package-lock.json:164
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…7pY+zoMV…h0x/Ptw8…8dg==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token cloud-api-worker/package-lock.json:181
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…b00+Gxjx…zRc/oZwU…hzA==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token cloud-api-worker/package-lock.json:249
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha512-vHk/hA7/1Ack…wbo+jaSh…Gtl+A5zq…HFg==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token cloud-api/package-lock.json:41
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha512-+iWb8…YNf+ly5S…Rag==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token cloud-api/package-lock.json:171
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…wIN//F77/IADDSs58i+MDaO…jeo+YFg==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token cloud-api/package-lock.json:642
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…Ki1+FTWx…bJ0+OjgA==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token cloud-api/package-lock.json:672
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…BGR+a8/ELrF…50n+5VMa…VXQ==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token cloud-api/package-lock.json:826
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…nt3+VK/BU3q…KDw+DYpW…WUg==",
    detector
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege providers/dropbox.sh:13
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition)
    Linux)  curl https://rclone.org/install.sh | sudo bash ;;
    detector
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege providers/gdrive.sh:31
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition)
    Linux)  curl https://rclone.org/install.sh | sudo bash ;;
    detector
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege providers/s3.sh:11
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition)
    case "$(uname -s)" in Darwin) brew install rclone 2>/dev/null || curl https://rclone.org/install.sh | bash ;; Linux) curl https://rclone.org/install.sh | sudo bash ;; esac
    detector
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege providers/webdav.sh:11
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition)
    case "$(uname -s)" in Darwin) brew install rclone 2>/dev/null || curl https://rclone.org/install.sh | bash ;; Linux) curl https://rclone.org/install.sh | sudo bash ;; esac
    detector

Files scanned: 32. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "triggers"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "tools"

Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 19 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (clawsync) differs from the folder (getlighty-clawsync)
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 40 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 3 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1520 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low The response is described with custom markup (3 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 218: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 40 items
  • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
ClawSync is a real sync tool, but it reaches beyond its stated scope by copying broad OpenClaw data and using weak or risky sync/auth setup paths.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026