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BC openclaw-ghost-pay

Discover Ghost payment requirements, execute real x402 calls, report x402 settlements, and run GhostWire quote/prepare/status flows for direct escrow.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: ghostprotoinfra v1.5.0 MIT-0 14 files body ≈ 927 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructureData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
77/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
80
Quality 40%
72
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
58/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 4
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key bin/create-wire-job-from-quote.mjs:19
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass INSTALL.md:33
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed
    powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File ./integrations/openclaw-ghost-pay/scripts/clawhub.ps1 publish ./integrations/openclaw-ghost-pay --slug openclaw-ghost-pay --name "Ghost Protocol OpenClaw Pay"
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass README.md:30
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed
    powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File ./integrations/openclaw-ghost-pay/scripts/clawhub.ps1 whoami
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass README.md:31
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed
    powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File ./integrations/openclaw-ghost-pay/scripts/clawhub.ps1 publish ./integrations/openclaw-ghost-pay --slug openclaw-ghost-pay --name "Ghost Protocol OpenClaw Pay"

Files scanned: 14. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 32 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 927 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 150: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 12 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 32 items
  • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a real payment integration, but it gives an agent live signer-backed payment authority with limited built-in safeguards.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026