SKILLEMALL.ai

BC gigo-lobster-resume

🦞 GIGO · gigo-lobster-resume: 续跑入口:v2 stable 当前会清理旧 checkpoint 并从头重跑;保留此 slug 作为旧 checkpoint 兼容入口。 Triggers: 继续试吃 / 恢复评测 / resume tasting / continue lobster eval.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: gigolab v2.1.2 MIT-0 80 files body ≈ 724 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureSoftware developmentInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
72
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
59/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-read-secret-files bundle/manifest.json:1608
    Reads credential / secret files (detector / deny-list definition)
    "cat\\s+.*\\.ssh/id_rsa",
    detector

Files scanned: 80. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 25 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 5 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 724 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 163: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 7 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 25 items
  • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a real benchmark runner, but it has enough high-impact, inconsistently disclosed behavior that users should review it before installing.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026