SKILLEMALL.ai

BC gingiris-twitter-agent-ops

Twitter/X Agent Operations SOP v2 — Rebuilt from real dual-account operations. Real data: • CN account: grew from 1,150 → 3,679 followers (~14 months), 1 tweet/day, OAuth1 direct post • EN account: Buffer API • Real incidents: cron silent-failed for 2 weeks unnoticed, analytics data off by 17×, thread performance worse than single posts What's new in v2: • Step-by-step onboarding (Q1→Q6), multiple choice wherever possible — no big forms • Mandatory daily log after every tweet + weekly report every Monday • Pre-publish safety checklist (agent must pass before posting) • Content pool tracker (used/unused) + alert when ≤3 items remain • Dual-account credential separation (CN: OAuth1 / EN: Buffer API) • MASTER-STATUS.md as the single source of truth — read + write every session 🇨🇳 Twitter/X Agent 运营 SOP v2 — 基于真实双账号运营经验重写。 开局对话式收集 context、强制日报+周报、发推前红线自检、素材库追踪、双账号凭证分离、MASTER-STATUS.md 单一真相来源。 真实数据:中文账号从 1,150 粉增长至 3,679 粉(约14个月),1条/天。 Triggers: "twitter运营" | "推特agent" | "发推SOP" | "AI代运营" | "推文日报" | "素材库" | "Buffer API" | "OAuth1发推" | "twitter automation" | "tweet sop" | "推特涨粉"

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Iris Wei v2.0.2 MIT-0 7 files body ≈ 3 183 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentsData and analyticsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
100
Quality 40%
55
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Shorten the description to 1024 characters.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 0

✓ No critical or high findings

Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error description-long description is 1096 chars, limit 1024

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 18 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3183 tokens
  • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 1095: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -213 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 6 example trigger phrases
  • +4Structure: 33 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 18 items
  • +4Has examples (15 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 55.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is a coherent Twitter/X operations assistant, but it should be reviewed carefully because it enables automated public posting, persistent local tracking, and credential-adjacent account handling without strong approval or secret-storage guardrails.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 14 Aug 2026