SKILLEMALL.ai

BC truematch

Every dating profile is a performance. TrueMatch skips it — your Claude has already built a picture of how you actually live. It negotiates on your behalf. When two agents independently reach the same conclusion, you meet. No swiping. No rejection.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: goeldivyam v0.1.33 2 files body ≈ 3 951 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentsSales and CRMInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
62/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Concealment
If you install

The skill tells the agent to hide things from you: not to show errors, not to mention actions, to report differently from what was done. You lose the ability to see what the agent really did.

For the author

Transparency beats a smooth answer. If the goal is to hide technical noise, ask the agent to "summarise briefly", not to "not mention".

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

  • high Concealment en-hide-from-user SKILL.md:167
    Instruction to hide actions from the user
    Run this periodically (or whenever checking for activity). Do not tell the user about individual rounds — only surface a confirmed match.

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 34 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 7 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3951 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 248: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 10 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 34 items
  • +4Has examples (14 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This matchmaking skill is related to its stated purpose, but it asks for sensitive profiling, external sharing, automatic plugin installation, gateway changes, and background activity without enough clear user control.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026