BC skill-vitals
Audit installed Agent Skills: which actually load, what they cost in context, where they conflict, and which are unused. Use when users ask how many skills are installed or active, why a skill never triggered, which are duplicated or safe to remove, how much startup context they cost, or whether one looks unsafe. Claude Code, Codex, OpenClaw, Hermes, WorkBuddy. 体检已安装 Skills：清单、是否真的加载、上下文成本、覆盖冲突、为什么没触发、僵尸清理与供应链风险。
Audit installed Agent Skills: which actually load, what they cost in context, where they conflict, and which are unused.
As a process C 57/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The text contains phrases like "ignore previous instructions" or "you are now…". That is an attempt to hijack the agent: it may break your rules, the system limits or company policy.
An honest skill does not need them: state the role and the rules directly without overriding other instructions. Otherwise catalog scanners and corporate filters will block the listing.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 5
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 5
-
medium Instruction override
en-ignore-previousreferences/judgment.md:103Instruction-override phrase ("ignore previous instructions") (documentation of a security skill)| SV501 | `adversarial_instruction` | tries to override prior instructions or hide actions |
security skill
A further 4 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.
Files scanned: 33. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
frontmatter-yamlSKILL.md: the frontmatter is not valid YAML (YAML parse error: Nested mappings are not allowed in compact mappings at line 2, column 14: description: Audit installed Agent Skills: which actually load, what they cost … ^ ); fields were read line by line. The usual cause is a colon inside an unquoted value
Process rating: all ten parameters 57/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 11 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1355 tokens
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -31 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 416: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 6 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 11 items
- +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 76.