SKILLEMALL.ai

AB znote

Create, manage, and operate a Zettelkasten slip-box note system using the zk.py CLI script. Use this skill whenever a user wants to build or use a Zettelkasten note system, manage atomic notes, create fleeting/literature/permanent notes, link notes together, find orphaned notes, generate Maps of Content, or search/browse a note vault. Trigger on phrases like "zettelkasten", "slip box notes", "atomic notes", "permanent notes", "znote", "zk notes", "note vault", "create a note", "link my notes", "find orphaned notes", "map of content", or "manage my notes with zk".

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Jay v1.0.0 MIT-0 3 files body ≈ 1 014 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 71/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: running it twice, progress reporting

GeneratorInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
95/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
95
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
71/100
Nearly there
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
Failures and branches w 10
55
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-eval-dynamic scripts/zk.py:168
      Dynamic code execution from decoded/untrusted input
      os.system(f'{editor} "{path}"')

    Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 71/100

    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
    • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 19 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1014 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 11 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 569: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 13 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 19 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 95.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This appears to be a legitimate note-taking skill, but it needs review because its helper script can run an environment-controlled editor command through the shell and its persistent filesystem setup is under-scoped.
    LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026