DB fish-tts
(no description)
As a process B 69/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, progress reporting
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 6
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 6
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medium Exfiltration
net-credential-useSKILL.md:25Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)curl -s -u "$NEXTCLOUD_USER:$NEXTCLOUD_PASS" \
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medium Exfiltration
net-credential-useSKILL.md:175Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)curl -s -u "$NEXTCLOUD_USER:$NEXTCLOUD_PASS" \
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medium Exfiltration
net-credential-useSKILL.md:235Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)if ! curl -s -u "$NEXTCLOUD_USER:$NEXTCLOUD_PASS" \
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medium Exfiltration
net-credential-useSKILL.md:335Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)curl -s -u "$NEXTCLOUD_USER:$NEXTCLOUD_PASS" \
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenSKILL.md:36High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)export NEXTCLOUD_PASS="N95q…EW5"
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenSKILL.py:18High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)NEXTCLOUD_PASS = os.environ.get('NEXTCLOUD_PASS', 'N95q…EW5')quoted
Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- error
frontmatterSKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found - error
name-missingSKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name` - error
description-missingSKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger
Process rating: all ten parameters 69/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 72 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2643 tokens
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- low 18 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 41 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 72 items
- +4Has examples (12 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.