SKILLEMALL.ai

BB ai-mother

AI Mother - Monitor and manage other AI agents (Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode, Aider, etc.). Use when asked to check AI execution status, supervise AI agents, help stuck AIs, coordinate multiple AI tasks, or act as an AI manager. Triggers on: "check AI status", "what are the AIs doing", "help the stuck AI", "manage AI agents", "AI mother", "supervise AIs", "patrol", "dashboard", "cleanup duplicates". Also triggers when owner replies to AI permission confirmations using "AI Mother: <response> <PID>" format (response can be any text: yes, no, 1, 2, allow once, etc.). When triggered, automatically run patrol.sh and show dashboard if user wants visual monitoring.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: 将军王谷 v1.0.1 MIT-0 39 files · 29 scripts body ≈ 3 560 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions

PersonaAI and agentsSoftware developmentInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
100
Quality 40%
70
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
68/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 0

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Files scanned: 39. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • warning frontmatter-yaml SKILL.md: the frontmatter is not valid YAML (YAML parse error: Nested mappings are not allowed in compact mappings at line 2, column 14: description: AI Mother - Monitor and manage other AI agents (Claude Code, Codex… ^ ); fields were read line by line. The usual cause is a colon inside an unquoted value

    Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 90 steps
    • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
    • 100Failures and branches. 3 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3560 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 16 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
    • low The response is described with custom markup (5 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -216 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
    • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
    • -312 of 32 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 10 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 666: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 26 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 90 items
    • +4Has examples (21 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 70.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill mostly matches its AI-supervisor purpose, but it has broad control over other agents, persistent monitoring, sensitive session access, and inconsistent approval boundaries.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026