SKILLEMALL.ai

BD screen-vision

AI screen vision and desktop computer control skill for OpenClaw. Let your AI agent see the screen, understand UI elements, and autonomously perform mouse and keyboard operations (click, type, scroll, drag) via a screenshot-analyze-action loop. Cross-platform: Linux (headless server with XFCE4+noVNC, or desktop), macOS (cliclick), Windows (pyautogui). Supports any OpenAI-compatible vision API (SiliconFlow, OpenAI, DashScope, Zhipu, Ollama, etc.). Smart diff detection saves tokens. Safety mechanisms block dangerous operations. Trigger: when user asks to operate/control computer, view/interact with screen, open applications, browse websites, fill forms, perform desktop GUI tasks, take screenshots, or any task requiring visual screen understanding and desktop automation. Keywords: computer use, screen control, desktop automation, GUI agent, visual agent, 屏幕操控, 桌面控制, 视觉代理, 截屏, 自动化操作, 远程桌面, AI操控电脑, screen vision, desktop agent, mouse keyboard automation, UI automation, computer use agent, CUA, computer control, screen interaction. Examples: "打开Chrome搜索天气", "看看屏幕上有什么", "帮我操作电脑", "截个屏", "open browser and search weather", "click the submit button", "take a screenshot", "fill this form", "帮我打开微信", "操作电脑下载文件", "远程操作桌面".

ClawHub Agent Skills author: guitu917 v1.1.0 MIT-0 19 files · 5 scripts body ≈ 1 003 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 44/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
76/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
85
Quality 40%
63
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
44/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Shorten the description to 1024 characters.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 3
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-execpolicy-bypass README.md:150
    Runs PowerShell with execution policy bypassed
    powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File scripts/setup/setu…ps1
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-eval-dynamic scripts/core/run_task.py:220
    Dynamic code execution from decoded/untrusted input
    os.system(f"cp {ss_path} {log_ss} 2>/dev/null")
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/vision/analyze.py:182
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment

Files scanned: 19. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error description-long description is 1230 chars, limit 1024

Process rating: all ten parameters 44/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (screen-vision) differs from the folder (ai-screen-vision)
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 17 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1003 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low The response is described with custom markup (3 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 1229: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -220 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 10 example trigger phrases
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 17 items
  • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 63.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill’s desktop-control purpose is clear, but it has unsafe defaults and weak safeguards for a tool that can view and operate a live computer.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026