SKILLEMALL.ai

FB social-media-metrics

(no description)

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade F
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Bright Guo v1.0.2 MIT-0 27 files body ≈ 1 460 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process B 73/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion

ReferenceData and analyticsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
F
38/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
64
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
73/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Tools and files w 18
60
Inputs and preconditions w 11
70
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store README.md:123
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    **Subsequent runs:** Cookies are persisted in the Chrome profile — no login needed until the session expires.
  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store SKILL.md:117
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    **Subsequent runs:** Cookies are persisted in the Chrome profile — no login needed until the session expires.

Files scanned: 24. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 73/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 80When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
  • 100Steps. 22 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 7 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1460 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
  • +4Structure: 15 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 22 items
  • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
  • +3All 1 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill appears intended to fetch social follower counts, but it uses anti-detection browser automation and stores reusable logged-in browser sessions, so users should review it before installing.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026