SKILLEMALL.ai

DC janitor

Automated transcript trimming, LLM memory extraction, and session hygiene for OpenClaw gateways. Keeps transcripts from bloating, extracts structured memories before archiving, and prunes stale sessions.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: halfdeadcat v1.6.0 MIT-0 15 files · 5 scripts body ≈ 2 320 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 52/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, consistency

IntegrationInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
41/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
19
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
52/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 9

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/setup.sh:211
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    (crontab -l 2>/dev/null; echo "$CRON_LINE  # session-janitor") | crontab -
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/setup.sh:228
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load "$PLIST_DEST" 2>/dev/null && \
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:124
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.session-janitor-watcher.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:125
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load  ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.session-janitor-watcher.plist
Medium and low: 5
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/setup.sh:233
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    echo "  Start:    launchctl load \"$PLIST_DEST\""
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/setup.sh:206
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    if crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -qF "session-janitor"; then
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/setup.sh:208
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (detector / deny-list definition; code comment)
    crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v "session-janitor" | { cat; echo "$CRON_LINE  # session-janitor"; } | crontab -
    detectorcomment
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/setup.sh:208
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v "session-janitor" | { cat; echo "$CRON_LINE  # session-janitor"; } | crontab -
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/setup.sh:211
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    (crontab -l 2>/dev/null; echo "$CRON_LINE  # session-janitor") | crontab -

Files scanned: 15. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 52/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 9 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (janitor) differs from the folder (session-janitor)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 21 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2320 tokens
  • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 203: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 21 items
  • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
  • +3All 10 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This cleanup skill mostly matches its purpose, but it has background access to sensitive session data and several under-disclosed ways to mutate, persist, or publish transcript-derived information.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026