SKILLEMALL.ai

AC skill-prescan

Pre-scan a SKILL.md locally before publishing to ClawHub. Simulates the ClawScan security review using the same prompt and evaluation criteria as the real scanner. Use when you want to check if your skill will pass ClawHub's security review before uploading.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: HanningWang v1.0.3 MIT-0 3 files body ≈ 1 416 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

AnalyzerAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
86
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/scan.py:409
      Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
      API key + configurable base URL from environment

    Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 27 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1416 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 258: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 14 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 27 items
    • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill’s scanning purpose is plausible, but its privacy boundary is unclear because it presents as local while sending analyzed skill content to a remote LLM provider.
    LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 18 Jun 2026