SKILLEMALL.ai

CC riskshield

RiskShield 案件审批自动化。使用 Playwright 浏览器自动化完成审批,支持 Pass/Refuse 两种操作。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: haoleizhang v1.0.0 MIT-0 80 files body ≈ 590 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedurePlaywrightSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
74/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
80
Quality 40%
66
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 20

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 20
  • low Obfuscation obf-base64-blob scripts/auto_approve_v2.js:30
    Long base64-looking blob (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    REDIRECT="aHR0…G1s"
    quoted
  • low Obfuscation obf-base64-blob scripts/auto_approve_v3.js:18
    Long base64-looking blob (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    REDIRECT="aHR0…G1s"
    quoted
  • low Obfuscation obf-base64-blob scripts/auto_approve.js:6
    Long base64-looking blob (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    REDIRECT="aHR0…G1s"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal scripts/auto_final.js:10
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    password: 'ZIdo…i1.',
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal scripts/auto_final2.js:10
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    password: 'ZIdo…i1.',
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal scripts/auto_fixed.js:10
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    password: 'ZIdo…i1.',
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal scripts/auto_pw.js:10
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    password: 'ZIdo…i1.',
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal scripts/auto_pw2.js:10
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    password: 'ZIdo…i1.',
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal scripts/browser_approve_v3.js:59
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    password: 'ZIdo…i1.',
  • low Obfuscation obf-base64-blob scripts/browser_approve_v3.js:60
    Long base64-looking blob (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    redirectUrl: 'aHR0…G1s'
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal scripts/browser_approve_v4.js:47
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    password: 'ZIdo…i1.',
  • low Obfuscation obf-base64-blob scripts/browser_approve_v4.js:48
    Long base64-looking blob (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    redirectUrl: 'aHR0…G1s'
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal scripts/browser_approve_v5.js:46
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    password: 'ZIdo…i1.',
  • low Obfuscation obf-base64-blob scripts/browser_approve_v5.js:47
    Long base64-looking blob (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    redirectUrl: 'aHR0…G1s'
    quoted
  • low Obfuscation obf-base64-blob scripts/debug_ui.js:3
    Long base64-looking blob (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    REDIRECT="aHR0…G1s"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal scripts/login.js:17
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    password: 'ZIdo…i1.',
  • low Obfuscation obf-base64-blob scripts/login.js:19
    Long base64-looking blob (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    redirectUrl: 'aHR0…G1s'
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/package-lock.json:18
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…uWm+fFRcIOgKBMiOBP+eXiy…9ab+DDKA==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal scripts/playwright_approve.js:10
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    password: 'ZIdo…i1.'
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal scripts/playwright_direct.js:9
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    password: 'ZIdo…i1.'

Files scanned: 80. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 9 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 590 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 64: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -374 of 76 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 12 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 9 items
  • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 66.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill matches its stated goal of automating RiskShield approvals, but it ships reusable credentials, a saved token, and many debug/API scripts that can access or change sensitive case data.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026