SKILLEMALL.ai

CB soulblock

Read, list, mint, and append Soul Blocks on Base. Read works without a wallet. Write operations use evm-wallet if available and fall back to website deep links.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: hburgoyne v0.1.0 7 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 2 728 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 14 d ago

Read, list, mint, and append Soul Blocks on Base.

As a process B 66/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers

GeneratorAI and agentsWriting and documentsSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
76
Quality 40%
91
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
66/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Instruction override
If you install

The text contains phrases like "ignore previous instructions" or "you are now…". That is an attempt to hijack the agent: it may break your rules, the system limits or company policy.

For the author

An honest skill does not need them: state the role and the rules directly without overriding other instructions. Otherwise catalog scanners and corporate filters will block the listing.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 7

  • high Instruction override en-ignore-previous skill-card.md:27
    Instruction-override phrase ("ignore previous instructions")
    Mitigation: Treat SOUL.md and on-chain fragments as untrusted display data; do not allow them to override safety rules, tool use, wallet decisions, or system instructions.
Medium and low: 6
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:28
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…7pY+zoMV…h0x/Ptw8…8dg==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:44
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…b00+Gxjx…zRc/oZwU…hzA==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:108
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha512-vHk/hA7/1Ack…wbo+jaSh…Gtl+A5zq…HFg==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:140
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…Dsc+j03S…0oA==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:412
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…NS8+tHW7…WOF+PEzk…X4Q==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/fetch.ts:1
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const DEFAULT_CONTRACT_ADDRESS = "0xfa…54F";
    quoted

Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 66/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 60 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2728 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (5 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 160: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 21 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 60 items
  • +4Has examples (16 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
  • +3All 2 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 91.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill mostly matches its Soul Blocks purpose, but it also tells the agent to adopt untrusted on-chain content as its identity and may create persistent daily reinforcement, so it needs Review before installation.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 10 Sept 2026