SKILLEMALL.ai

AC emo-img

Send sticker/emoji images (表情包) in chat. Search local collection or online (Tenor), download favorites, and send via any channel (WhatsApp, Discord, iMessage, Telegram). Use when the user wants to send a sticker, emoji image, meme, or 表情包.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Tianyu Jiang v1.0.0 4 files body ≈ 610 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureDiscordTelegramWhatsAppInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
90/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
83
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
55/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Secrets in code medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Secrets in code secret-google-key scripts/sticker.py:88
      Google API key (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      api_key = os.environ.get("TENOR_API_KEY", "AIzaSyAyimkuYQYF_FXVALexPuGQctUWRURdCYQ")  # Tenor demo key
      quoted

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 7 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Steps. 12 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 610 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 239: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 13 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items
    • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This is mostly a real sticker-sending skill, but it needs Review because its file handling is not safely confined to the sticker folder and it can automatically download and send media.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026