SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

BC bidding-hunter

Automated government procurement bid discovery engine. Scans multiple Chinese procurement platforms, matches configurable keywords, tracks bid statuses, and delivers deadline-aware reports. Users configure their own keywords and monitoring targets; built-in adapters cover 5 major platforms with an extensible plugin model for adding more.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: HuaGavin v0.1.0 MIT-0 36 files body ≈ 2 159 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Automated government procurement bid discovery engine.

As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, progress reporting

ProcedurePlaywrightProcurementtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
86
Quality 40%
88
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
55/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 14

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 14
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:110
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "integrity": "sha5…cjV+2Z+GK+EEY7…R4x+N3TA…nIr+TMcC…z6Q==",
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:182
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "integrity": "sha512-oGB+Uxlg…BKZ+GTy0…lih/NSHS…cSg==",
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:196
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "integrity": "sha5…824+DRGG…2ZG+X/H9Nk+Q6EV…XAg==",
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:322
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "integrity": "sha5…FSj+bWLt…2sH/Kn8E…h6w==",
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:368
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "integrity": "sha5…vZS+VIDU…jX4+qx9M…saQ==",
      quoted
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/explore-platform.js:79
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
      args: ['--no-sandbox', '--disable-setuid-sandbox'],
      detectorcode literal
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/explore-platform.js:84
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
      args: ['--no-sandbox', '--disable-setuid-sandbox'],
      detectorcode literal
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege src/detail-fetcher.js:193
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
      args: ['--no-sandbox', '--disable-setuid-sandbox', '--disable-dev-shm-usage'],
      detectorcode literal
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege src/detail-fetcher.js:198
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
      args: ['--no-sandbox', '--disable-setuid-sandbox'],
      detectorcode literal
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege src/detail-fetcher.js:311
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
      args: ['--no-sandbox', '--disable-setuid-sandbox', '--disable-dev-shm-usage'],
      detectorcode literal
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege src/detail-fetcher.js:316
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
      args: ['--no-sandbox', '--disable-setuid-sandbox'],
      detectorcode literal

    A further 3 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 33. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 35 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2159 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 339: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 23 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 35 items
    • +4Has examples (14 code blocks)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 88.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill is mostly a coherent bid-monitoring tool, but it needs Review because it can auto-run local JavaScript adapters and its local-only privacy claims do not clearly cover webhook notifications.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · 9 Aug 2026