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BD openclaw-security-practice

OpenClaw 极简安全实践指南 - 适用于 AI Agent 拥有 Root 权限的场景。包含事前（行为黑名单/安全审计）、事中（权限收窄/哈希基线/业务风控）、事后（自动巡检/Git灾备）的完整安全体系。Use when: configuring OpenClaw security, reviewing skill installations, performing security audits, or handling sensitive operations.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: huamu668 v1.0.0 3 files body ≈ 1 444 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 41/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerSoftware developmentInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
78/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
83
Quality 40%
70
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
41/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 9

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 9
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention README.md:29
      Mentions editing / listing crontab (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
      | **权限持久化** | `crontab -e`（系统级）、`useradd/passwd/visudo` |
      tablesecurity skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention SKILL.md:50
      Mentions editing / listing crontab (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
      | **权限持久化** | `crontab -e`（系统级）、`useradd/usermod/passwd/visudo`、`systemctl enable/disable` 新增未知服务、修改 systemd unit 指向外部下载脚本/可疑二进制 |
      tablesecurity skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process SKILL.md:50
      Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
      | **权限持久化** | `crontab -e`（系统级）、`useradd/usermod/passwd/visudo`、`systemctl enable/disable` 新增未知服务、修改 systemd unit 指向外部下载脚本/可疑二进制 |
      tablesecurity skill

    A further 6 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • warning frontmatter-yaml SKILL.md: the frontmatter is not valid YAML (YAML parse error: Nested mappings are not allowed in compact mappings at line 2, column 14: description: OpenClaw 极简安全实践指南 - 适用于 AI Agent 拥有 Root 权限的场景。包含事前（行为黑名单/安全审计）、事中… ^ ); fields were read line by line. The usual cause is a colon inside an unquoted value
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "triggers"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 41/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (openclaw-security-practice) differs from the folder (huamu668-openclaw-security)
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, git, python, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 46 steps
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1444 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -221 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 238: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 22 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 46 items
    • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 70.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This is a security guide, but it recommends persistent automation that can scan sensitive areas and automatically push credentials, identity data, and OpenClaw state to a remote Git repository.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026