SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

CF one-mail

统一邮箱管理 CLI，支持 Gmail、Outlook、网易邮箱（163.com、126.com）。适用于：(1) 收取/发送邮件，(2) 跨账户搜索邮件，(3) 管理多个邮箱账户，(4) 查看邮件统计。当用户提到邮件、邮箱、email、发邮件、收邮件、查邮件时触发。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Baixun.Huang v1.3.0 20 files · 12 scripts body ≈ 411 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process F 28/100 · Will not run — weak spots: steps, result and completion, when it triggers

IntegrationGmailOutlookInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
70/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
70
Quality 40%
70
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
28/100
Will not run
Steps w 15
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 6
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/lib/outlook.sh:76
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    local raw_emails=$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $access_token" "$api_url")
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/read.sh:116
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    msg_id=$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $access_token" "$search_url" | jq -r '.value[0].id // empty')
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/read.sh:119
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    msg_id=$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $access_token" "$search_url2" | jq -r '.value[0].id // empty')
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/read.sh:123
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    msg_id=$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $access_token" "$search_url" | jq -r '.value[0].id // empty')
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/read.sh:134
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    local raw=$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $access_token" "$mail_url")
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/uninstall.sh:27
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo rm -f "$INSTALL_DIR/onemail"

Files scanned: 20. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 28/100

  • 0Steps. Prose only: no discrete steps
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 411 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3No numbered steps or checklist
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -32 of 8 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 134: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 10 headings
  • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 70.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a real email-management skill, but it stores long-lived mailbox credentials and contains unsafe command construction that could let crafted email arguments run unintended commands.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026