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BB huawei-cloud-ces-ecs-monitoring

Huawei Cloud ECS monitoring skill using Cloud Eye Service (CES). Provides comprehensive monitoring and metrics query for Elastic Cloud Server instances including CPU, memory, disk, network, and system metrics. Supports real-time monitoring, historical data query, and common metric analysis. Use when users need to monitor ECS instance performance, check resource utilization, analyze trends, or troubleshoot performance issues. Triggers: "Huawei Cloud ECS monitoring", "ECS metrics", "Cloud Eye Service", "CES", "monitor ECS", "CPU usage", "memory usage", "disk IO", "network traffic", "instance performance", "monitoring data", "华为云ECS监控", "云监控", "CES监控", "ECS指标", "CPU使用率", "内存使用率", "磁盘IO", "网络流量"

ClawHub Agent Skills author: huaweicloud-skills-team v1.0.0 MIT-0 10 files body ≈ 3 644 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

Huawei Cloud ECS monitoring skill using Cloud Eye Service (CES).

As a process B 71/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, progress reporting

ProcedureInfrastructureData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
77/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
64
Quality 40%
96
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
71/100
Nearly there
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Failures and branches w 10
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 8

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 8
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:49
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo mv hcloud /usr/local/bin/
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:54
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo mv hcloud /usr/local/bin/
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:73
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo mv hcloud /usr/local/bin/
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:78
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo mv hcloud /usr/local/bin/
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cli-installation-guide.md:157
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo bash ./hcloud_install.sh
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/troubleshooting-guide.md:85
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo mv hcloud /usr/local/bin/
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/troubleshooting-guide.md:126
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo mv hcloud /usr/local/bin/
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/acceptance-criteria.md:334
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - **Validation**: Security penetration testing

    Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 71/100

    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 85Steps. 96 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Result and completion. Output format and completion criterion are stated
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3644 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
    • low The response is described with custom markup (3 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 12 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 700: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 40 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 96 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (8 of 8)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 96.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill's core monitoring flow is legitimate, but its bundled guidance asks for broader cloud/admin powers and risky local setup/cleanup than monitoring requires.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · 21 Jul 2026