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BA huawei-cloud-devbridge-tunnel

Create and manage DevBridge development tunnels on Huawei Cloud to securely expose local development services to remote devices. Based on DevBridge CLI v0.1.12+ and Huawei Cloud IAM authentication. Use this skill when the user wants to: (1) install and configure the DevBridge CLI, (2) create/list/update/delete tunnels, (3) manage tunnel ports and protocols, (4) host local services through tunnels, (5) connect to remote tunnels from another device, (6) manage authentication and tokens. Trigger: user mentions "DevBridge", "开发隧道", "开发者隧道", "dev tunnel", "tunnel", "host local service", "expose local port", "connect tunnel", "托管本地服务", "隧道端口", "devbridge", "DevSpace", "开发空间隧道"

ClawHub Agent Skills author: huaweicloud-skills-team v1.0.0 MIT-0 10 files · 1 script body ≈ 4 430 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Create and manage DevBridge development tunnels on Huawei Cloud to securely expose local development services to remote devices.

As a process A 83/100 · Runs to the end — weak spots: running it twice

GeneratorSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
77/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
63
Quality 40%
97
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
A
83/100
Runs to the end
Running it twice w 4
30
Tools and files w 18
60
Inputs and preconditions w 11
70
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 13

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 13
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell references/cli-installation-guide.md:22
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -fsSL https://res-hd.hc-cdn.cn/sharedata/hdspace/devbridge/install.sh | bash
      security skill
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell references/cli-installation-guide.md:123
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -fsSL https://res-hd.hc-cdn.cn/sharedata/hdspace/devbridge/install.sh | bash
      security skill
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell scripts/devbridge_cmd.sh:250
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed)
      echo "Run: curl -fsSL https://res-hd.hc-cdn.cn/sharedata/hdspace/devbridge/install.sh | bash"
      code literal
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:87
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -fsSL https://res-hd.hc-cdn.cn/sharedata/hdspace/devbridge/install.sh | bash
      security skill
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:147
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -fsSL https://res-hd.hc-cdn.cn/sharedata/hdspace/devbridge/install.sh | bash 2>/dev/null; \
      security skill
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:170
      Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -fsSL https://res-hd.hc-cdn.cn/sharedata/hdspace/devbridge/install.sh | bash
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc references/cli-installation-guide.md:61
      Writes to a shell startup file (documentation of a security skill)
      echo 'export PATH="$HOME/.huawei/bin:$PATH"' >> ~/.bashrc
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc references/cli-installation-guide.md:68
      Writes to a shell startup file (documentation of a security skill)
      echo 'export PATH="$HOME/.huawei/bin:$PATH"' >> ~/.zshrc
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc references/troubleshooting.md:31
      Writes to a shell startup file (documentation of a security skill)
      echo 'export PATH="$HOME/.huawei/bin:$PATH"' >> ~/.bashrc
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc references/troubleshooting.md:38
      Writes to a shell startup file (documentation of a security skill)
      echo 'export PATH="$HOME/.huawei/bin:$PATH"' >> ~/.bashrc
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process SKILL.md:209
      Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
      nohup python3 -m http.server <port> > /tmp/devbridge-service.log 2>&1 &
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process SKILL.md:210
      Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
      nohup db_host <tunnelId> > /tmp/devbridge-host.log 2>&1 &
      security skill

    A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 83/100

    • 30Running it twice. 28 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4430 tokens
    • 85Steps. 55 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Result and completion. Output format and completion criterion are stated
    • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
    • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
    • low The response is described with custom markup (30 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 10 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 679: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 41 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 55 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (16 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (7 of 7)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 97.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill does what it says, but it can silently install software, authenticate to Huawei Cloud, expose local services remotely, run background processes, and delete tunnel resources without enough user control.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · 11 Aug 2026