BC qwen-vision-rename
根据图片内容批量重命名本地图片文件。这是一个 skill，不是可调用工具；先用 read 打开本文件，再执行脚本命令，绝不能直接发出名为 qwen-vision-rename 的 tool call。用户提到“改名/重命名/按图片内容命名/整理图片文件名/整理图片”时必须使用本技能。默认直接执行改名，仅在用户明确要求“预览/试运行/dry-run”时先出计划不改文件。
As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 2
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medium Exfiltration
net-redirectable-api-keyscripts/vision_rename.py:122Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another serverAPI key + configurable base URL from environment
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-autorun-instructionSKILL.md:20Instructs the agent to auto-run a script on every session- Always execute the script. Do not fabricate recognition results.
Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 23 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 6 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 706 tokens
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 2 example trigger phrases
- +3Description length 185: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 5 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 23 items
- +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
- +3All 1 scripts are documented
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 80.