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BD linux-performance-analyzer

Linux 系统性能分析与调优全能专家。融合多个专项 skill 精华，覆盖 CPU、内存、磁盘 I/O、 网络、内核参数、编译优化、容器/K8s 等全维度。触发场景： (1) 系统变慢/卡顿/负载高/响应慢 (2) 内存不足/OOM Kill/Swap 使用率高 (3) CPU 使用率异常/iowait 高/上下文切换过多 (4) 磁盘读写慢/I/O 瓶颈/iowait 高 (5) 网络延迟/丢包/TIME_WAIT 过多/吞吐不足 (6) 需要调整 sysctl 内核参数 (7) GCC/Clang/Rust 编译优化建议 (8) 解读 top/vmstat/iostat/perf/sar/ss 等命令输出 (9) 容器/K8s 资源争抢/CPU throttling (10) 建立性能基线/监控告警体系

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: joeytao v1.0.0 MIT-0 12 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 1 962 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerKubernetesInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
75/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
73
Quality 40%
79
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/disk_io.md:318
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    echo "0 3 * * 0 smartctl -a /dev/sda > /var/log/smart-sda-$(date +\%Y\%W).log" >> /etc/crontab
Medium and low: 5
  • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump references/memory.md
    Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (1) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
    references/memory.md
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/cpu.md:108
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    systemctl enable --now cpu-performance.service
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/disk_io.md:254
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    systemctl enable fstrim.timer
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/disk_io.md:314
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    systemctl enable --now smartd
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/memory.md:158
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    systemctl enable --now disable-thp.service

Files scanned: 12. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 10 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1962 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 359: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 27 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 10 items
  • +4Has examples (21 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (7 of 7)
  • +3All 2 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This is a coherent Linux performance troubleshooting skill, but it includes powerful admin-level tuning examples that users should apply carefully.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026