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FD linux-sysadmin

Linux 系统管理专家 — 覆盖用户权限、SSH、存储、网络、systemd、防火墙、 监控日志、备份恢复、证书TLS、Ansible、容器、IaC 十二大模块。 提供配置→验证→加固→监控→备份→自动化→故障排查→回滚完整闭环。 触发关键词：useradd/sudo/sshd_config/chmod/SELinux/fdisk/LVM/fstab/RAID/nmcli/iptables/firewalld/systemd/Prometheus/logrotate/rsync/borgbackup/certbot/OpenSSL/Ansible/Docker/Terraform。

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade F
ClawHub Agent Skills author: joeytao v3.0.2 MIT-0 29 files · 7 scripts body ≈ 2 753 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureDockerTerraformInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
33/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
3
Quality 40%
79
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 40

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/backup_manager.sh:187
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    cron_backup=$(crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -i "backup\|borg\|restic\|rsync" | grep -v "^#")
Medium and low: 39
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-disable-security references/firewall_security.md:86
    Disables a security control (Defender, Gatekeeper, SIP, firewall, execution policy) (documentation of a security skill)
    iptables -F
    security skill
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-disable-security references/firewall_security.md:269
    Disables a security control (Defender, Gatekeeper, SIP, firewall, execution policy) (documentation of a security skill)
    ufw disable
    security skill
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence references/firewall_security.md:352
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (documentation of a security skill)
    chmod 600 /etc/crontab
    security skill
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-read-secret-files references/ssh_management.md:63
    Reads credential / secret files (documentation of a security skill)
    ssh-copy-id -i ~/.ssh/id_e…pub user@remote-host
    security skill
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs-scoped references/storage_filesystem.md:93
    Destructive command on a partition / current directory (normal in admin docs; verify the target) (documentation of a security skill)
    mkfs.ext4 /dev/vg_data/lv_data
    security skill
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs-scoped references/storage_filesystem.md:94
    Destructive command on a partition / current directory (normal in admin docs; verify the target) (documentation of a security skill)
    mkfs.xfs /dev/vg_data/lv_logs
    security skill
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs-scoped references/storage_filesystem.md:188
    Destructive command on a partition / current directory (normal in admin docs; verify the target) (documentation of a security skill)
    mkfs.ext4 /dev/sdb1
    security skill
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs-scoped references/storage_filesystem.md:192
    Destructive command on a partition / current directory (normal in admin docs; verify the target) (documentation of a security skill)
    mkfs.xfs /dev/sdb1
    security skill
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs-scoped references/storage_filesystem.md:196
    Destructive command on a partition / current directory (normal in admin docs; verify the target) (documentation of a security skill)
    mkfs.btrfs /dev/sdb1
    security skill
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-disable-security references/user_permission.md:339
    Disables a security control (Defender, Gatekeeper, SIP, firewall, execution policy) (documentation of a security skill)
    setenforce 0              # 切换到 Permissive（不重启）
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/backup_recovery.md:150
    Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
    systemctl enable --now rsync
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell references/container_management.md:30
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation of a security skill; the skill's own vendor host)
    curl -fsSL https://get.docker.com | bash
    security skillvendor-host
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/container_management.md:40
    Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
    systemctl enable --now docker
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/firewall_security.md:175
    Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
    systemctl enable --now nftables
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/firewall_security.md:451
    Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
    systemctl enable --now fail2ban
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc references/infrastructure_as_code.md:84
    Writes to a shell startup file (documentation of a security skill)
    echo 'export PATH="$HOME/.tfenv/bin:$PATH"' >> ~/.bashrc
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/infrastructure_as_code.md:796
    Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
    - systemctl enable --now docker
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/infrastructure_as_code.md:797
    Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
    - systemctl enable --now nginx
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/infrastructure_as_code.md:817
    Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
    systemctl enable --now node_exporter
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/infrastructure_as_code.md:900
    Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
    systemctl enable --now nginx
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/monitoring_logging.md:53
    Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
    systemctl enable --now sysstat
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/monitoring_logging.md:138
    Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
    systemctl enable --now node_exporter
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/monitoring_logging.md:205
    Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
    systemctl enable --now prometheus
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/monitoring_logging.md:270
    Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
    systemctl enable --now grafana-server
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/monitoring_logging.md:491
    Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
    systemctl enable --now elasticsearch
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/quick_reference.md:64
    Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
    | 开机自启 | `systemctl enable svc` | references/systemd_services.md |
    tablesecurity skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/quick_reference.md:67
    Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation table row; documentation of a security skill)
    | 定时任务 | `systemctl enable --now myapp.timer` | references/systemd_services.md |
    tablesecurity skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/quick_reference.md:238
    Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
    systemctl enable --now myapp
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/quick_reference.md:300
    Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
    systemctl daemon-reload && systemctl enable --now node_exporter
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/systemd_services.md:27
    Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
    systemctl enable nginx
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/systemd_services.md:29
    Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
    systemctl enable --now nginx   # 启用并立即启动
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/systemd_services.md:219
    Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
    systemctl enable --now backup.timer
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/backup_manager.sh:187
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    cron_backup=$(crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -i "backup\|borg\|restic\|rsync" | grep -v "^#")
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/cert_check.sh:186
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    elif crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -q certbot; then
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/system_audit.sh:186
    Mentions editing / listing crontab (documentation of a security skill)
    crontab -l 2>/dev/null || echo "  无 root crontab"
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention SKILL.md:178
    Mentions editing / listing crontab (documentation of a security skill)
    systemctl list-timers --all && crontab -l 2>/dev/null
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:275
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (negated — the text forbids it)
    - 不要用 `chmod 777` 解决权限问题
    negated

A further 2 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

Files scanned: 22. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 32 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2753 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 295: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 18 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 32 items
  • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (13 of 13)
  • +3All 7 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a coherent Linux administration skill, but it includes high-impact commands and audit scripts with weak safeguards that users should review before running.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026