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AB aegisclaw

Use this skill when the user asks to manage Binance assets, check account security, scan for arbitrage opportunities, or perform automated dust sweeps. Commands: init, check, scan, arbitrage, dust, report, status. Requires BINANCE_API_KEY and BINANCE_API_SECRET environment variables.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: hyy2099 v1.0.0 MIT-0 20 files body ≈ 1 133 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 68/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureData and analyticsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
98
Quality 40%
81
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
68/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv README.md:41
      Reads a .env file (documentation of a security skill)
      cp .env.example .env
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host README.md:79
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -fsSL https://cdn.anthropic.com/install.sh | sh
      security skill

    Files scanned: 20. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 68/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 85Steps. 48 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
    • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1133 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +4No input/output examples
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 284: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 17 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 48 items
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This Binance skill is mostly coherent with its stated purpose, but it can use live exchange credentials to change account balances without a clear confirmation or dry-run safeguard.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026