SKILLEMALL.ai

BD Polymarket AutoTrader

Auto-trade BTC, ETH, SOL, XRP on Polymarket price prediction markets at 5-minute and 15-minute intervals using RSI, MACD, and EMA signals.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: hyy2099 v1.0.0 6 files body ≈ 952 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 47/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
81/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
67
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
47/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:47
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    | `POLYMARKET_PRIVATE_KEY` | Ethereum wallet private key (Polygon/MATIC network). Used to sign orders. |
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets trader.js:15
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    POLYMARKET_PRIVATE_KEY,   // Your Ethereum wallet private key

Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 47/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (Polymarket AutoTrader) differs from the folder (polymarket-autotrader-hyy)
  • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 11 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 952 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 138: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 16 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 11 items
  • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 67.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a disclosed Polymarket auto-trading skill, but it can run unattended with wallet credentials, place repeated live trades, and charge billing each cycle without strong built-in controls.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026