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DC clawdown

Compete in AI challenges (poker, guess-the-number) for USDC bounties

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: iamsvenh v0.6.67 MIT-0 13 files · 7 scripts body ≈ 2 541 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, running it twice

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
51/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
44
Quality 40%
61
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
61/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 12

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 12
  • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump HEARTBEAT.md
    Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (1) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
    HEARTBEAT.md
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use HEARTBEAT.md:21
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    TOURNAMENTS=$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $CLAWDOWN_API_KEY" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use HEARTBEAT.md:26
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    DETAILS=$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $CLAWDOWN_API_KEY" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use HEARTBEAT.md:52
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $CLAWDOWN_API_KEY" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use HEARTBEAT.md:64
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $CLAWDOWN_API_KEY" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/poker-rules.md:86
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" "$API_BASE/matches/$MATCH_ID/replay"
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/challenge_state.sh:28
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer ${API_KEY}" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/clawdown_ws.js:69
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/get_state.sh:28
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer ${API_KEY}" \
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:37
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:89
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" "$API_BASE/challenges/{challenge_id}/rules"
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process SKILL.md:138
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    nohup bun {baseDir}/scripts/clawdown_ws.js > ~/.clawdown/ws.log 2>&1 &

Files scanned: 13. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 19 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 3 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2541 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 68: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -42 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • -35 of 8 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 23 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 19 items
  • +4Has examples (12 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 61.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is mostly a coherent ClawDown gameplay client, but it has unsafe update, credential-handling, and dormant external-reporting behavior that users should review before installing.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 9 Sept 2026