SKILLEMALL.ai

BB officecli-academic-paper

Use this skill to build academic-style .docx output: journal / conference / thesis chapters carrying formal citation style (APA, Chicago, IEEE, MLA), numbered equations, figure & table cross-references, footnotes/endnotes, bibliography, or multi-column journal layout. Trigger on: 'research paper', 'journal paper', 'conference paper', 'manuscript', 'thesis', 'APA', 'MLA', 'Chicago', 'IEEE two-column', 'bibliography', 'hanging indent', 'citation style', 'abstract + keywords', 'equation numbering', 'cross-reference', paper with footnotes/endnotes. Output is a single .docx.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: 瓦砾 v1.0.2 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 11 206 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, execution cost, running it twice

GeneratorWordResearchPersonal productivitytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
89/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
99
Quality 40%
74
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
65/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:16
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - **macOS / Linux**: `curl -fsSL https://d.officecli.ai/install.sh | bash`
    vendor-hostquoted

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 11206 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 11206 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 85Steps. 53 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
  • 100Failures and branches. 9 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 19 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (3 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 576: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 38 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 53 items
  • +4Has examples (20 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 74.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is mostly a coherent OfficeCLI academic document guide, but its setup asks users to run remote installer scripts directly in a shell.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 3 Jul 2026