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DD video-frames-skill

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Liu Wenyu v1.0.0 MIT-0 4 files · 1 script body ≈ 2 144 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 44/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureMedia and videoInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
43/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
71
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
44/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 9

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 9
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc scripts/diagnose.sh:215
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo "   echo 'export PATH=\"\$HOME/.local/bin:\$PATH\"' >> ~/.zshrc"
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc scripts/diagnose.sh:216
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo "   source ~/.zshrc"
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:24
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/indulgeback/video-frame-extractor/main/install.sh | bash
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc SKILL.md:59
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo 'export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"' >> ~/.zshrc
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc SKILL.md:88
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo 'export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"' >> ~/.zshrc
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host _meta.json:25
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (string literal in code, not executed)
    "command": "curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/indulgeback/video-frame-extractor/main/install.sh | bash"
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc scripts/diagnose.sh:59
    Writes to a shell startup file (string literal in code, not executed)
    check_info "请运行: echo 'export PATH=\"\$HOME/.local/bin:\$PATH\"' >> ~/.zshrc && source ~/.zshrc"
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host scripts/diagnose.sh:90
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (string literal in code, not executed)
    check_info "请运行安装脚本: curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/indulgeback/video-frame-extractor/main/install.sh | bash"
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host scripts/diagnose.sh:207
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (string literal in code, not executed)
    echo "   curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/indulgeback/video-frame-extractor/main/install.sh | bash"
    code literal

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 44/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 21 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2144 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
  • -234 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 55 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 21 items
  • +4Has examples (36 code blocks)
  • +3All 1 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This is a coherent video-frame extraction skill, with the main caution that its installer runs a mutable remote shell script.
LLM: benign (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026