SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

CC autotask-mcp

Use when you need to interact with Datto/Kaseya Autotask PSA via an MCP server (tickets, companies, contacts, projects, time entries, notes, attachments, and queries). Includes Docker Compose + helper scripts to pull/run the Autotask MCP server locally and configure required environment variables.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Infinite Loop v1.0.4 13 files · 9 scripts body ≈ 727 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationDockerAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
67/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
56
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/cron_install.sh:69
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl bootstrap "gui/$(id -u)" "$PLIST_PATH"
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/cron_uninstall.sh:36
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    (crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v "autotask-mcp" || true) | crontab -
Medium and low: 4
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/cron_uninstall.sh:12
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    PLIST_PATH="$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/${PLIST_LABEL}.plist"
    code literal
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security README.md:143
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - **No privilege escalation** — `no-new-privileges` security option enabled
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/cron_uninstall.sh:35
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    if crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -q "autotask-mcp"; then
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/cron_uninstall.sh:36
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    (crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v "autotask-mcp" || true) | crontab -

Files scanned: 12. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "env"

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
  • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 10 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 727 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 298: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 5 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 10 items
  • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
  • +3All 8 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This skill is a disclosed local Docker wrapper for an Autotask MCP server, with credential and auto-update risks that are mostly documented and purpose-aligned.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026