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BD solana-wallet

Manage Solana and Polygon wallets, run Polymarket weather arbitrage, post to X/Twitter, and execute Raydium swaps — all from natural language.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: inspiration_gx v1.1.2 28 files body ≈ 2 333 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 47/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
75/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
80
Quality 40%
68
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
47/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 12

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 12
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:227
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    wallet private key                 (AES-256-GCM, per-wallet salt → ~/.raphael/)
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets src/polymarketClob.ts:5
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    // Order signing: EIP-712 Order struct signed with the EVM wallet private key.
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/balance.ts:25
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    { programId: new PublicKey("Toke…5DA") }
    quoted
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv src/environment.ts:8
    Reads a .env file (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    if (!val) throw new Error(`Missing required env var: ${key}\nRun: cp .env.example .env && pnpm setup`)
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/evmBalance.ts:9
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const USDC_ADDRESS = "0x3c…359" // Native USDC on Polygon
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/polymarketClob.ts:13
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const USDC_POLYGON = "0x3c…359"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/polymarketClob.ts:16
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const NEG_RISK_CTF_EXCHANGE = "0xC5…80a"
    quoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url src/polymarketOracle.ts:184
    Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
    `https://clob.polymarket.com/price?token_id=…&side=…
    placeholder
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/swap.ts:9
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    export const SOL_MINT         = "So11…112"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/swap.ts:10
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    export const USDC_MINT        = "EPjF…t1v"  // mainnet USDC
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/swap.ts:11
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    export const USDC_DEVNET_MINT = "4zMM…cDU"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal src/wallet.ts:51
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    const secretKey = bs58Decode(priv…s58)

Files scanned: 28. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 47/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (solana-wallet) differs from the folder (raphael-solana)
  • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 22 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2333 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low The response is described with custom markup (22 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 142: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 19 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 22 items
  • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 68.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This wallet and trading skill mostly matches its stated purpose, but it needs review because setup exposes the master wallet password and the package contains high-impact automated trading behavior.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026